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RECENT DECISIONS*
Code Practice-Directed Verdicts Under the Comparative Negligence Statute.-Action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant Transport Company for personal injuries sustained from a collision between a truck driven by the plaintiff and defendant's trolley bus.
Plaintiff's truck was east-bound on East Knapp street and defendant's
trolley bus was north-bound on North Milwaukee street in the city of
Milwaukee. The collision occurred at the intersection of these streets.
A stop sign governs traffic of vehicles running east and west on East
Knapp street. The jury found the operator of the trolley bus guilty of
negligence as to the rate of speed at which he entered the intersection
and as to the manner in which he controlled the movement of the trolley
bus after it entered the intersection. Plaintiff was found negligent as to
the manner in which he controlled his truck after he entered the intersection. The proportion of the plaintiff's causal negligence was set at
33 1-3 per cent, defendant's at 66 2-3 per cent. Upon appeal the defendant Transport Company claimed that the plaintiff's causal negligence was, as a matter of law, equal to or greater than that of the defendant's operator. The Supreme Court held that no rule of thumb can
be laid down with respect to the apportionment of neglignece between
a plaintiff and a defendant and that in this case the court could not hold,
under the evidence, that the plaintiff's negligence was as a matter of
law equal to that of the defendant. Campanelli v. Milwaukee Electric
Ry. & Transport Co. 8 N. W. (2d) 390 (1943).
The rule set down by the court in the instant case is consistent with
every decision handed down since the passage of the Comparative Negligence Statute Sec. 330.045 Wis. Stats. in 1931. The general rule with
respect to directed verdicts under this statute is, perhaps, best stated in
the language of the court in Hansburyv. Dunn, 230 Wis. 626,284 N. W.
556 (1939) : "It is true that the court may *beable to determine from
the record that two items of negligence of the same character are equal
in quality or that as a matter of law one of them is greater than the
other. This is more apt to be possible in cases where speed, lookout, o?'
violation of some particular rule of the road is involved. It is less apt to
be possible in cases involving findings of negligence with respect to
management and control. In any event, it must be possible from all the
circumstances of the case as disclosed by the record for this court to be
able to say that the negligences are equal in quality and that is why this
court has said that it can rarely come to this conclusion. We are satisfied, however, that the court may not adopt a rule of thumb that will
check off automatically lookout against lookout, control against control,
etc., holding these items equal in every case."
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While it is certainly clear from the language quoted above that each
case must rest upon its own facts and circumstances, the cases, looked
upon as units, point to a few general rules. The first, and, perhaps, the
broadest of these is that whenever the character and quality of the
negligence of the plaintiff and defendant are different it is a matter for
the jury alone. In the case of Honore v. Ludwig, 211 Wis. 354, 247 N.
W. 335 (1933), the defendant was found negligent as to speed, lookout,
and control, and the plaintiff as to lookout, control and disregard for
other users of the highway. The court held that although the charges of
negligence were equal in number, the character of the charges were
different and the matter should, in such cases, be left for the jury. The
same conclusion was reached in the following cases: Brown v. Haertel,
210 Wis. 345, 244 N. W. 630, (1932) ; Steidle v. Caliebe, 215 Wis. 582,
254 (1934) ; McGuiggan v. Hiller Brothers 209 Wis. 402, 245 N. W.
97, (1931); Bent v. Jonet, 213 Wis. 635, 252 N. W. 290; Doepke v.
Reinter, 217 Wis. 49, 258 N. W. 345 (1935).
Another group of cases indicate that where the plaintiff and the defendant are negligent in an equal number of respects, the negligence of
one will be held equal to that of the other so long as the quality of the
one does not outweigh the other. In the case of Peters V. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific RR. Co., 230 Wis. 299, 283 N. W. 803,
(1939), the plaintiff was found negligent in failing to look out before
entering upon a railroad crossing, and the defendant was found negligent in failing to give a signal. The court held the negligence of both
equal as a matter of law. Again, in Geyer v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co.,
230 Wis. 347, 284 N. W. 1, (1939), the negligence of the plaintiff in
failing to yield the right of way was held equal to that of the defendant
who failed to keep a proper lookout. Decisions to like effect are: Sikora
v. Great Northern RR. Co., 230 Wis. 283, 282 N. W. 588, (1939);
Evanich v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. 237 Wis. 111, 295 N. W. 44,
(1941) ; DuBois v. Johnson, 238 Wis. 161, 298 N. W. 590, (1941). In
cases where the charges of negligence are equal in number but where
the particular kind of negligence on the part of one outweighs that of
the other, the courts will hold such negligence to be greater as a matter'
of law. Such was the case of Beatti v. Strosser, 240 Wis. 65, 2 N. W.
2nd 713 (1942), in which the plaintiff, a minor child, ran out between
parked cars and, was struck by the defendant's car. Both parties were
found negligent as to lookout but thenegligence of the plaintiff because
of its peculiar character was held greater as a matter of law.
Still another group of cases may be viewed as a unit to discover that
even though one party may be found negligent in the greater number of
respects, yet his total negligence will be held less as a matter of law than
one who is guilty of the fewer charges of negligence but whose negli-
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gence is of such outrageous character as to completely outweigh all the
charges against the other. A good example within this class of cases is
Hustad v. Evetts, 230 Wis. 292, 282 N. W. 595, (1939). In this case,
the plaintiff was an experienced milk man. He stepped from his wagon
without looking for traffic and was found negligent in this respect. The
defendant whose automobile struck the plaintiff as he did so step off his
wagon was found negligent as to speed, lookout and management. The
court held that the plaintiff's negligence, by its very character, was as a
matter of law greater than that of the defendant. The following cases
are similar in effect: Wedecky v. Grimes 229 Wis. 448, 282 N. W. 593,
(1938) ; Noyes v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 237 Wis. 141, 294 N. W.

63, (1941).
Lastly there are a few cases which stand as individual holdings and
do not, from the point of their outcome, fall into any of the groups of
cases indicated herein. In Patterson v. Chicago, St. Pa., Milwaukee &
0. R. Co. 236 Wis. 205, 294 N. W. 63, (1940), the plaintiff was at a
place to board the defendant's train. In order to do so he had to cross
certain tracks. He was struk and injured. Plaintiff was found negligent with respect to lookout. The defendant was found negligent in failing to keep a proper guard for the protection of the defendant. The
court held that the negligence of the plaintiff was as a matter of law
equal to that of the defendant. There was a strong dissent by three
judges in this case. A like decision with a dissent is Hoskins v. Thenell,
232 Wis. 97, 286 N. W. 555, (1939).
ANTHONY J. PALAsz.

Federal Jurisdiction-Common Law Crimes Against the United
States.-In United States v. Jerome, 87 L. Ed. 433 (1943),--U.S.-,
S. Ct. -, the defendant was charged with violating section 2(a) of the
bank robbery act (May 18, 1934) 48 Stat. 783 c. 304 (August 24, 1937)
50 stat. 749, c. 747, 12 U.S.C.A. 588b which provides in part that "whoever shall enter or attempt to enter any bank or any building used in
whole or in part as a bank with intent to ocmmit in such bank or building
or part thereof, so used, any felony or larceny shall be fined not more
than $5,000.00 or imprisoned for more than tw.enty years or both." The
defendant was an army officer who while attempting to borrow money
from a National Bank was informed that he would be required to obtain
the signature of an officer of at least equal rank as surety upon his note.
The defendant forged the signature of an officer of superior rank. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals and quashed the indictment on the grounds
that the crime of forgery, although a felony under the laws of Vermont,

